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PLACING THE FACTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE
DECISIONMAKING BEFORE REVIEWING COURTS:
ENGLISH AND AMERICAN TECHNIQUES
ROBERTS

B.

OWEN*

I. INTRODUCTION

The work of the English and American teams that participated
in the Seventh Anglo-American Exchange was directed to the theory and practice of judicial review of administrative action. As the
only currently practicing litigator on the American team, I found
myself focusing principally during the Exchange on the "trial
problems" presented by the differing procedures in the two countries. Specifically, stimulated by personal experience as counsel for
parties seeking to challenge various types of federal administrative
actions in United States courts, my attention was directed primarly to the rights of plaintiffs' counsel in seeking to place the "facts"
of the decisionmaking process before reviewing courts.
Not unexpectedly, the practices followed in the two countries are
somewhat different. The differences seem to derive, at least in
part, from the differences in certain basic attitudes toward the
problem of "government secrecy." Over the years Americans have
come to feel that they have an inalienable right to know what is or
has been going on within their central government, as the enactment of the Freedom of Information Act' demonstrates. The English, on the other hand, have tended to be far more restrictive in
this regard, as demonstrated by the relatively broad scope of the
traditional "Crown privilege."'2 Given these quite different
* Partner, Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C.; Fellow, American College of Trial
Lawyers.
1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982).
2. See, e.g., Attorney-General v. Mayor & Corp. of Newcastle-upon-Tyne, [1897] 2 Q.B.
384, 395 (C.A.). This traditional constitutional precept, which, among other things, requires
anonymity for subordinate civil servants in the decisionmaking process, more recently has
been referred to as "public interest immunity." See Air Canada v. Secretary of State, [1983]
2 A.C. 394, 407-09 (noting that the Crown privilege is still broad but no longer absolute;
courts must weigh the need for disclosure against the "public interest" in nondisclosure).

742

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:741

attitudes, it is hardly surprising to find that in the United States
plaintiffs seeking to delve into the administrative decisionmaking
process of the central government are allowed greater freedom of
action than their English counterparts.
This difference also may be enhanced by the rather different attitudes taken toward pretrial discovery in the two countries. Americans have come to believe that every civil litigant is entitled
before trial to discover all relevant facts known to the opposing
party, subject only to the conventional attorney-client privilege
and related limitations. In England, on the other hand, a litigant's
rights to such foreknowledge traditionally have been significantly
more restricted. Although the main engine of discovery in the
United States, the pretrial deposition, is of only limited relevance
in the context of judicial review of administrative action, nonetheless the fact that a pretrial deposition in England is permitted only
for the purposes of preserving testimony and not for the purposes
of discovery reveals the difference between the basic attitudes toward pretrial discovery in the two countries.3 The comparatively
restrictive English approach toward discovery in general has narrowed the scope and detail of the factual picture presented to English courts in judicial review proceedings, while simultaneously allowing for speedier resolutions at lower public and private costs.
Doubtless the ongoing debate as to the proper balance between
American thoroughness and English efficiency will continue for
years to come.
From the perspective of a trial lawyer, the process of placing the
facts before the reviewing court begins with an effort to determine
accurately why the individual or institution that made the challenged decision acted as it did. Specifically, the inquiry must be
whether the decisionmaker made a rational decision, taking into
account the factors that it was required to consider and excluding
improper considerations. In assisting the court in this process,
counsel must seek out the evidence best calculated to make clear
what was in the mind of the decisionmaker. The proper approach
is clear enough when the administrative body itself has compiled a
formal evidentiary record and prepared a formal decision, but in

3. See Epstein, English and American Discovery: Comparative View, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 26,
1984, at 15, 18.
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other situations English and American proceduralists have come
up with somewhat different approaches for handling the same basic inquiry. The following discussion compares these approaches.

II.

PROCEDURES FOR PLACING FACTS BEFORE REVIEWING COURTS

A. Written Evidence
1. English Procedure
A useful starting point for the comparison is the modern English
procedure. Since the decision of the House of Lords in O'Reilly v.
Mackman,4 virtually all applications for judicial review of administrative action in England have been brought under Order 53 of the
Rules of the Supreme Court, 5 which provides a simplified review
procedure applicable both to the prerogative remedies-mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition-and to other remedies such as declarations, injunctions, and damages. In effect, Order 53 requires that, in an application for review, the facts must be
presented to the court by way of affidavit, and the normal practice
is for the official entity whose decision is being challenged to present an affidavit explaining, perhaps well after the fact, both the
content and the rationale of the challenged decision. Typically, the
same entity also will attach to the affidavit and present to the reviewing court any documents it considers relevant. At that point
the court has authority to order discovery to the extent that justice
requires, subject to Crown privilege and the other restrictions
placed on discovery in England. Such discovery, however, is rarely
if ever granted in practice. As a practical matter, once the government has produced its papers, including the all-important affidavit,
the court hears oral presentations from counsel, deriving the facts
from the assembled documents without any presentation of oral
testimony.
To an American litigator, the most striking aspect of this procedure is the relatively heavy emphasis placed upon the affidavit and
the documents selected by the government. This procedure would
seem to give the government a relatively high degree of control
4. [1983] 2 A.C. 237 (1982).
5. STAT. INST., 1977, No. 1955.
6. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
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over the selection of the facts to be presented to the court. Reflecting the American attitude toward this approach, the United States
Supreme Court has characterized "litigation affidavits" generally
as "merely 'post hoc' rationalizations," which in the United States
"have traditionally been found to be an inadequate basis for [judicial] review."'7 Perhaps reflecting a lesser degree of confidence in
the candor of public officials than would obtain in England, one
United States court has observed that "'post hoc rationalizations,'
filtered through a factfinder's understandable reluctance to disbelieve the testimony of a Cabinet officer, will rarely provide an effective basis for [judicial] review. '
2. United States Procedure
The American approach, by contrast, is to focus almost entirely
on the documentation created within the agency at the time the
decision was made, rather than on statements prepared for the
purposes of the litigation. Under United States law, the government usually is obliged to produce "the full administrative record
that was before the [decisionmaker] at the time he made his decision."" Essentially, the "administrative record" includes any written statement of the reasons for the decision and all documents
and other materials that were directly or indirectly relied upon or
7. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419 (1971).
8. D.C. Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231, 1237-38 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (footnote
omitted), cert. denied mem., 405 U.S. 1030 (1972).
The English practice does at least require the person or persons with knowledge of the
facts of the decisional process to present a sworn statement. One American writer has taken
umbrage at the practice of employing sworn affidavits, however, stating that it "is a departure from the deeply established custom that neither judges nor administrators should be
required to swear to the opinions they write in explaining reasons for their decisions, and no
reason has been stated for such a departure." K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIEs, § 11.00, at 36 (Supp. 1980). Professor Davis is correct about the deeply established
custom that judges are not required to swear to their judicial opinions and that administrators are not required to swear to explanations of decisions if those explanations are provided
contemporaneously with the decisions, but a different situation is presented when an administrator is seeking to establish facts that occurred in the past. A "litigation affidavit" of the
kind employed in England typically will describe the historical facts surrounding the decision, as well as the decision itself, and in such circumstances a sworn affidavit seems
appropriate.
9. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971); see also
Administrative Procedure Act, § 706, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982) (providing that the reviewing
court shall consider "the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party").
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considered by the decisionmakers at the time they acted."0 In addition, documents considered or relied upon by subordinates who assisted in the decisionmaking process have been considered a part
of the administrative record, on the theory that such documents
indirectly were considered by the decisionmaker."
Moreover, when judicial review is sought in a federal trial court,
as usually would be true when the agency did not undertake a full
factfinding adjudication, the United States plaintiff is entitled
under the discovery rules to take the initiative in requesting not
only "the full administrative record," but also any other categories
of documents that counsel can persuade the presiding judge to
treat as relevant to the issues raised in the case. To give just one
example, when the challenged decision was based on a particular
interpretation of a statute or regulation, the plaintiff generally can
obtain discovery of documents reflecting any different interpretations that officials of the same agency may have articulated over
time.12 The discoverability of other categories of documents depends on the circumstances of the particular case.
Discovery in such cases in the United States, however, is not unrestricted. Apart from conventional privileges, such as the attorney-client privilege, the courts have created an exemption for
predecisional memoranda prepared within the agency "embodying
the deliberative process of the agency and its staff."' 3 Conversely,
however, all "postdecisional memoranda" reflecting the reasons for
the decision are open to discovery and must be produced, whether
the government wishes to produce them or not. 14 In practice,

10. Lloyd v. Illinois Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F. Supp. 575, 590 (N.D. I1. 1982); Pierson v. United States, 428 F. Supp. 384, 391-92 (D. Del. 1977).
11. See Tenneco Oil Co. v. Department of Energy, 475 F. Supp. 299, 317-19 (D. Del.
1979).
12. See Fedman, Looking Behind the Record-An Analysis of Contemporaneous Construction Discovery, 17 TULSA L.J. 448 (1982).
13. National Courier Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 516 F.2d 1229,
1241 (D.C. Cir. 1975); see Renegotiation Bd. v. Grumman Aircraft Eng'g Corp., 421 U.S.
168, 184 (1975); NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 150-54 (1975); Montrose
Chem. Co. v. Train, 491 F.2d 63, 66-67 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
The obvious reason for this exemption is that public disclosure of internal staff communications would discourage a full and frank exchange of views during the deliberative process.
See Fedman, supra note 12, at 464.
14. See Renegotiation Bd. v. Grumman Aircraft Eng'g Corp., 421 U.S. 168, 184 (1975);
NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 150-54 (1975).
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therefore, the breadth of discovery permitted in a review proceeding in the United States is significantly greater than that permitted in an English proceeding under Order 53, in which the defending litigant would appear to have a greater degree of freedom to
decide what is relevant and what should be produced.
B. Oral Testimony
1. Use in the United States
One of the curiosities of the vocabulary of administrative law in
the United States is that, despite the need for reviewing courts to
probe the facts sufficiently to decide whether a challenged administrative decision was arbitrary or rational, and whether the decisionmaker took into account the appropriate considerations and
excluded inappropriate considerations, United States reviewing
courts constantly deny the propriety of judicial attempts to "probe
the mental processes of the administrator. '15 In this context the
word "probe" has taken on a special meaning-namely, that a reviewing court is free to delve as deeply as possible into the thinking of an administrative decisionmaker through analysis of contemporary documents surrounding the decisionmaking process, but
that in ordinary circumstances the court should not permit crossexamination of the decisionmaker. Of course, the irony is that, in
the often difficult process of determining what was in the decisionmaker's mind, United States courts permit themselves full access to historical documents that may or may not provide a clear
answer to the inquiry, but normally deny themselves the opportunity to obtain a direct answer by simply asking the decisionmaker
what he actually had in mind.
The history and rationale, such as it is, underlying the "antiprobing" rule may be traced by reference to the opinion of Justice
15. This phrase apparently derives from the opinion of Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan v.
United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938), in which the Chief Justice stated: "[I]t
was not the function of the court to probe the mental processes of the Secretary in reaching his conclusions ...... Id. at 18. Courts considering administrative law cases in the United States have
repeated this phrase regularly during the last 50 years. See, e.g., United States v. Morgan,
313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941); Kent Corp. v. NLRB, 530 F.2d 612, 621 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 920 (1976); KFC Nat'l Mgmt. Corp. v. NLRB, 497 F.2d 298, 304 (2d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1087 (1976); Davis v. Braswell Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 363 F.2d
600, 604 (5th Cir. 1966).
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Frankfurter in the Supreme Court's fourth decision in United
6 In
States v. Morgan."
that case, which involved judicial review of
a controversial decision by the Secretary of Agriculture, the trial
court had required the Secretary to give evidence, both on pretrial
deposition and at trial, "regarding the process by which he reached
the conclusions of his order."1 The Supreme Court, on direct appeal, reversed the trial court's decision on several grounds, including the propriety of subjecting the Secretary to cross-examination.
Noting that the Secretary had "dealt with the enormous [administrative] record in a manner not unlike the practice of judges in
similar situations," Justice Frankfurter reasoned that the administrative proceeding had "a quality resembling that of a judicial proceeding." Because "a judge cannot be subjected to such scrutiny,"
Justice Frankfurter concluded, "the Secretary should never have
been subjected" to oral examination.18
In seeking to flesh out the asserted principle as it relates to
judges, however, Justice Frankfurter cited earlier Supreme Court
decisions' 9 which, if read closely, create some confusion as to the
reasons underlying the principle that a judge never should be required to give testimony concerning the method used to to arrive
at a particular judicial decision. The principle seems to derive from
an early rule that jurors could not be compelled to testify concerning what they did and did not decide in a prior case. The rationale
for the rule concerning jurors was that, because each juror has an
independent mind, "the jurors oftentimes, though they may concur
in the result, differ as to the grounds or reasons upon which they
arrived at it. ' '2o This rationale, of course, would not apply to a decision made by a single trial judge. Nonetheless, the Supreme

16. 313 U.S. 409 (1941).
17. Id. at 422.
18. Id.
19. Id. (citing Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Babcock, 204 U.S. 585, 593 (1907), and Fayerweather v. Ritch, 195 U.S. 276, 306-07 (1904)).
Apparently the law now allows a court to require a judge to testify if the judge's testimony is necessary to determine what transpired in a particular case. 8 J. WIGMoRE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2372, at 757-58 (3d ed. 1961). Professor Wigmore, however, did not
address whether a court can compel a judge to testify as to why that judge ruled a certain
way in a particular case.
20. Packet Co. v. Sickles, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 580, 593 (1866).
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Court in Fayerweather v. Ritch21 treated earlier cases establishing
the principle for jurors as having laid down "the rule" that a trial
judge is "obviously incompetent" to testify concerning what issues
he did and did not decide in a earlier case.2 2 The Court acknowledged that "the reasoning" of the juror decisions "is not wholly
applicable" when only a single judge is involved, 23 but the Court
did not feel compelled to provide any other reason for the prohibition against testimony by a judge.
Justice Frankfurter made some effort to fill this gap when he
extended the "anti-probing" principle to administrative decisionmakers in Morgan. He simply asserted, somewhat cryptically
and without any citation of authority, that the examination of a
trial judge as to his decisionmaking in an earlier case "would be
destructive of judicial responsibility. 2 4 Some would disagree, contending that the prospect of cross-examination would tend to increase judicial responsibility by creating an incentive toward a high
degree of care in the preparation of findings and opinions. Nonetheless, the "rule" seems sound for other reasons. Actual crossexamination of a judge would be demeaning for the judiciary and
well might lessen public respect for the institution in an undesirable way. Whether the same rationale is equally applicable to administrative decisionmakers, however, is open to question. Perhaps
it would depend on the bureaucratic level involved, the issue that
was decided, and other circumstances.
At any rate, in the years since Morgan, courts in the United
States have been willing to authorize, albeit in very limited circumstances, the very sort of "probing" of administrative thought
processes that was condemned in Morgan. The most famous instance is Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,25 in
which the Secretary of Transportation claimed to have considered
certain factors that a statute required him to consider in arriving
at a decision but was unable to produce any documentary evidence
that he had done so. The only materials proffered by the Secretary
were certain "litigation affidavits" prepared long after the decision
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

195 U.S. 276 (1904).
Id. at 306-07.
Id. at 307.
313 U.S. at 422.
401 U.S. 402 (1971).
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had been made. 26 Reluctant to approve the Secretary's action without having seen the actual "administrative record,"27 and foreseeing the possibility that no real administrative record would ever
turn up, the United States Supreme Court explicitly authorized
the district court on remand to require the decisionmakers to "give
testimony explaining their action" if the district court concluded
that testimony was "the only way there can be effective judicial
review. '28 Significantly, although two justices thought that a remand back to the Secretary would be more appropriate, 29 no jus-

tice disagreed with the majority opinion's authorization of oral
testimony.30
Overton Park was not a one-time aberration, as at least two subsequent Supreme Court decisions have confirmed. In Camp v.
Pitts,31 the Court carefully emphasized that its authorization in
Overton Park of compelled oral testimony by the decisionmaker
applies only when no "administrative record" is available as a
predicate for judicial review. The Court, however, also reiterated
that if judicial review otherwise would be rendered ineffective, the
district court had the discretionary power to compel the agency to
explain its action "either through affidavits or testimony. 3 2 Four
years later, in Village of Arlington Heights v. MetropolitanHousing Development Corp.,33 the Court again affirmed the principle
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

407-09.
419; see supra note 7 and accompanying text.
420.
421 (Black, J., concurring, joined by Brennan, J.).

30. One commentator has expressed "perplexity" as to "why the Supreme Court did not
simply ask the Secretary to file a statement of the basis" of his decision, rather than authorizing his cross-examination. 3 K. DAvis, ADMNISMTRATivE LAW TREATISE § 17.4, at 290 (2d ed.
1980). At the risk of being accused of probing the mental processes of Justice Marshall when
he wrote the opinion in Overton Park, one may speculate first that the total absence of any
written record of a statutorily-required formal decision, which the Secretary claimed to have
made, raised in the Court's mind a question as to the Secretary's credibility, and second
that the Court believed that the district court should be free to authorize cross-examination
of the Secretary if that course seemed necessary to find out what actually happened. Certainly the events that occurred on remand, including revelation of the fact that the Secre-

tary had not made the finding he claimed to have made, provide some justification for the
testimonial course suggested in the Supreme Court's opinion. See Citizens to Preserve Over-

ton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 335 F. Supp. 873 (W.D. Tenn. 1972).
31. 411 U.S. 138 (1973).
32. Id. at 142-43.
33. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).

750

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:741

that a decisionmaker "might be called to the stand at trial to testify concerning the purpose of the official action" if the other available evidence were3 4insufficient to adjudicate the merits of the
plaintiff's challenge.
Some commentators have reacted strongly to Overton Park,
Camp, and Arlington Heights, maintaining that even a very limited authorization of cross-examination of the decisionmaker is totally inappropriate. 5 The answer to this criticism is that the rule,
as it has evolved, permits such compelled testimony only upon (1)
a strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior or (2) a judicial
determination that no other means is available for providing effective judicial review." When the rule is stated in those terms, the
37
argument that the rule is imprudent is difficult to maintain.
Moreover, in a number of reported cases in which district courts
have decided to permit cross-examination of a decisionmaker, the
result has been to expose violations of the law that otherwise might
have gone undetected.3 8 So far as I know, no commentator has
identified an actual case in which a court authorized the taking of
oral testimony and it turned out to be contrary to some recognizable public interest. Provided that this method of taking evidence is
used only under the close supervision of the trial judge and is limited to situations in which it is justified in accordance with the

34. Id. at 266, 268.
35. See, e.g., K. DAvis, supra note 8, § 11.00, at 36 ("Having administrators testify about
their decisions is no more seemly than having judges testify about their decision [sic].").
36. See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420.
37. Cf. Schicke v. Romney, 474 F.2d 309, 319 (2d Cir. 1973) ("We see no objection to
plaintiffs' deposing the Secretary if that should be neccessary to a determination of whether
).
the Secretary obeyed the statutory mandate ..
38. On remand in Overton Park, for example, the district court authorized a pretrial deposition of the decisionmaker, a process that ultimately provided "overwhelming" evidence
that the decisionmaker had not considered the factors he had been required to consider by
statute. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 335 F. Supp. 873 (W.D. Tenn.
1972). Similarly, in D.C. Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1030 (1972), the district court required the decisionmaker to testify at the
trial, and that testimony led the court of appeals to conclude, as in Overton Park, that the
decisionmaker had failed to comply with the requirements of the statute. Id. at 1238-39. My
view of the rightness of the latter conclusion is admittedly partial: I represented the plaintiffs in the action. See also Biscayne Fed. Say. & Loan v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 572
F. Supp. 997, 1006 (S.D. Fla. 1983) (chairman of Home Loan Bank Board testified, after
being served with notice of deposition, concerning rationale for decision).
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stringent standards noted above, it would seem by hypothesis to be
in the public interest.
2. Use in the United Kingdom
Given the very recent flowering of the English procedure under
Order 53, it is too early to know whether English law will develop
in a parallel way. Inquiries directed to British counsel, including
members of the English team during the Anglo-American Exchange, suggest that no applicant for judicial review of a decision
of the central government has even requested, much less been
granted, judicial leave to cross-examine the decisionmaker. Under
the English practice, thus far at least, the usual decisionmaker's
affidavit and documents seem to have been viewed as the only
proper sources of the facts."'
On the other hand, in O'Reilly v. Mackman,40 Lord Diplock foresaw the possibility that "rare occasions" might arise in which "the
interests of justice will require that leave be given for crossexamination of deponents on their affidavits in applications for judicial review. ' 41 This last statement seems to indicate that, if an
English applicant for judicial review came forward with "a strong
showing of bad faith or improper behavior, '42 or if effective judicial review appeared to be impossible without oral testimony by
the decisionmaker, an English reviewing court might be inclined to
grant leave for cross-examination of the responsible official, just as
would be done in the United States.43
III. CONCLUSION

Despite significant differences between British and American attitudes toward such matters as "government secrecy" and pretrial
discovery, recent case law in both countries indicates a trend toward the development of similar procedural approaches in the field

39. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
40. [1983] 2 A.C. 237 (1982).
41. Id. at 282.
42. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420.
43. See R. v. Secretary of State, ex parte Powis, [1981] 1 W.L.R. 584, 595-96 (C.A. 1980)
(discussing the need for the taking of evidence when the proceedings may have been tainted
by official misconduct).
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of administrative law. In judicial review of administrative action,
as in many other areas of the law, thoughtful British and American
judges have tended to develop remarkably similar approaches over
time. This tendency perhaps is due, at least in part, to constructive
exercises such as the Anglo-American Exchange.

